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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the way education and conflict have become entangled together 
during the post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ response to ‘radical Islam’ at home and abroad. 
The paper charts the complex ways that education has been deployed to serve 
Western military and security objectives in multiple locations in the global south and 
how these strategies have now returned to the ‘West’ in the form of CVE 
interventions. Drawing on Foucault’s concept of the ‘boomerang effect’ I will explore 
whether and how education techniques and strategies deployed abroad in pursuit of 
imperial interests, return to the West and are deployed to monitor, control and 
suppress marginalized communities in a form of ‘internal colonialism’. Finally, the 
paper brings the two sections together to explore commonalities and divergences in 
the findings.   
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Introduction	
The role of education in ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE), has emerged as an 
important area of research and practice both in education and in international 
development, two fields of inquiry that I work across. I have however, watched from 
afar, for several years now, as this area has emerged on the national and international 
stage. Partly, this was due to other research commitments, but I have also kept a 
distance out of concern that the area was highly ideological, security led and unlikely 
to be a space where ‘open’ reflection, critique and debate could take place. The debate 
‘post-9/11’ is often so polarized, that it is difficult to chart an intellectual path which 
is neither categorized as apologist for terrorist atrocities nor cheerleader for the 
imperialist ambitions and practices of Western states.  
Recently, however, I attended several policy workshops.  The first was led by the 
Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies1, the second led by the Swiss 
Development Cooperation Agency2 and the third run by Wilton Park and the UK 
Foreign office3. All the events confirmed my earlier fears, but this was tempered with 
the realization of the necessity of intervening in these spaces to challenge both the 
practices and assumptions that underpin much of the mainstream CVE thinking. I fear 
that these approaches, albeit unintentionally, might be driving young people towards 
‘extremism’ rather than combatting it – through lack of reflexivity, humility, 
historical memory and nuance on the part of the architects and practitioners of CVE 
as they try to address this important issue. My experience in these events, also made 
me realize that many people in national governments, NGOs and international 
organizations are also uneasy about the ‘security’ approach and implications of CVE 
and are looking for alternative and more progressive ways of addressing, what is 
undoubtedly a defining issue of our time.  
This paper then is an attempt to contribute to an emerging critique of the 
mainstream education for CVE approach by interrogating its security roots in post 
9/11 western military interventions and the implications therein for education and 
society in the UK and elsewhere4. In the next section, I begin by providing some 
theoretical grounding for the subsequent historical and empirical evidence presented, 
by exploring the interconnections and disjunctures between Western foreign policy 
and domestic policy, education and security and its implications. Secondly, I then 
trace the security roots and logic of ‘CVE and education’ approaches back to their 
imperial roots in the mountains of Pakistan, and the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Somalia and other zones of contention, where education systems and education 
communities have become caught up in diverse ways with post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’ 
security agendas.  This is then followed up with examples exploring the evolution of 
the UK’s ‘Prevent’ strategy and how it relates to the UK education system. In 
conclusion, I will reflect on these North-South relations, the commonalities and points 
of divergence and suggest a way forward for an alternative CVE movement and the 
role of education therein.  
                                                1	See	(http://www.ineesite.org/en/round-table-role-of-education-youth-urban-violence-extremism	)	2	See	(http://www.norrag.org/fileadmin/Events/PVE_Workshop_INPUT_paper_final.pdf	)		3	See	https://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/event/wp1510/		4	In	this	I	would	like	to	note	the	work	of	Dr	Ayaz	Naseem	and	Adeela	Arshad-Ayaz,	based	at	Concordia	for	organising	the	‘Symposia	of	Teaching	about	Extremism,	Terror	and	Trauma’,	2016,	Montreal,	where	a	version	of	this	paper	was	first	presented,	and	where	I	found	an	open	and	transformative	space	to	discuss	and	engage	critically	with	CVE	with	a	wide	range	of	participants.	See	Arshad-Ayaz,	A	&	Naseem,	M.A	(2017)	for	further	information.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the	two	anonymous	peer-reviewers	for	their	extremely	helpful	comments	on	earlier	drafts	of	this	paper.		
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Foucault’s	Boomerang	and	the	Security/Education	Nexus	
In his annual lecture series in 1975, Michel Foucault, explored the relationship 
between war, society and governance. In one of these lectures, he talked of a 
‘boomerang effect’, whereby imperial policies and practices deployed abroad return 
home in surprising ways. Foucault noted that:  
It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its 
political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to 
other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the 
mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and 
techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to 
the West, and the result was that the West could practice something 
resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself. (Foucault 2003: 
103) 
Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended 
The idea of Foucault’s ‘boomerang’ was extended and applied in relation to post 9/11 
‘war on terror’ realities in a fascinating book by Stephen Graham (2011), the critical 
geographer, who explored the way military technologies of surveillance and control, 
developed to fight wars in faraway lands, had returned to the Western homelands – 
with drones, as a memorable example, now being used by many Western police forces 
to monitor their own populations. This led me to reflect on work I had done on the 
securitization and militarization of international development assistance to education, 
post 9/11 (see Novelli, 2010,2013) and its connections to some of the recent counter-
terrorism encroachments into education systems in the West, and the UK in particular. 
Our disciplinary and thematic foci often obscure relationships, and my own focus on 
‘international development and education’ had avoided seeing and tracing some of 
these connections happening in the education system in my own country, the UK. 
This paper then seeks to begin the process of thinking through these interconnections 
between the education/development/security nexus ‘abroad’ and the 
education/development/security nexus at ‘home’. In order to ground the later 
discussion, I want in this section to make a number of conceptual points that we can 
problematize through the empirical evidence. 
The first point relates to the broad field of International Development, and by default 
the sub-field of ‘education and international development’ and its geographical focus. 
As several commentators have noted, the binary focus of our field on ‘developing 
countries’ in an unequal, uneven, interconnected and complex globalized world is 
becoming increasingly unhelpful in addressing the key questions of our time. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, drawing on the concept of the ‘Global South’ 
problematizes this through the idea of the ‘south in the north’ and the ‘north in the 
south’ to highlight that in pockets of the geographical ‘South’ there is wealth that 
rivals anything in the ‘North’ and vice-versa, in the ‘North’ we have pockets of 
deprivation, poverty and disease that mirror the experiences of many so called 
‘developing countries’. As a result, he calls for the use of the term ‘Global South’ to 
be used as a metaphor for those population groups effected by the ‘systemic and 
unjust human suffering caused by global capitalism and colonialism’ (Santos, 
2015:134). This definition, I believe, can assist us in extending our geographical gaze 
beyond its traditional parameters, and help us to reframe International Development 
as a field of struggle and of academic study for challenging the economic, political, 
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social and cultural barriers to achieving global social justice for all (Maxwell, 2008; 
Unterhalter, 2007). Furthermore, issues of both ‘global terrorism’ and the current 
‘refugee crisis’ have highlighted the complex interconnections between ‘north’ and 
‘south’, and that what happens in conflict affected contexts in faraway places might 
have effects on security closer to home. All of this evidences the need for a much 
more fluid geographical approach to international education and development.  
The second point I wish to explore here is the relationship between security and 
development, which is central to the focus of this paper. In mainstream development 
thinking, the birth of ‘development’ as concept and field is located in the post WWII 
period, and with the then US President’ Truman’s, now famous, Point 4, speech 
where he talked of ‘development’ as a new relationship between the West and the 
rest, with the US at its helm. A relationship based on ‘democratic fair-dealing’, 
whereby the US would support ‘peace-loving peoples’ toward fulfilling their hopes 
and dreams: 
 The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our 
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts 
of democratic fair-dealing. All countries, including our own, will greatly 
benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world’s human 
and natural resources. 
While many authors have debated the integrity of the speech’s content (see Escobar, 
2011; Rist, 2002) its timing reflects a period of transition from direct colonial rule to 
post-colonial independence for many ‘developing’ countries. An alternative reading 
of the roots of ‘international development’ traces it back to colonialism and highlights 
the way ‘development’ emerged as a mechanism to quell anti-colonial protest 
movements through a combination of social reforms (carrots) and repressive policing 
(stick), which resonates strongly with contemporary counter-insurgency strategy 
which we see in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere today (c.f Duffield & Hewitt, 2013). 
These two readings of the roots of international development reflect both the upbeat 
idealism and the ‘realpolitik’ that continues to penetrate the field, with the USA both 
offering a helping hand whilst simultaneously developing a political and military 
strategy to ensure the reproduction of its own hegemonic position, as was clearly 
evidenced and documented during the Cold War (Christian Aid 2004). After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between western security interests and 
development resurfaced under the guise of ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Africa and 
the Balkans in the 1990s and has become increasingly intertwined since 9/11, where 
the link between conflict, security and state failure in some parts of the Global South 
was becoming increasingly associated with terror attacks in the West. Since then, 
more and more ‘development’ assistance has been targeted towards conflict-affected 
contexts in the Global South through peacekeeping, peacebuilding, post-conflict 
reconstruction and development assistance (see Duffield 2007; Novelli, 2010). 
Furthermore, after the 2008 global economic crisis, discourses around the necessity of 
development assistance to protect our own ‘western’ security, have increasingly been 
deployed in response to a sceptical media and electorate seeking to redeploy budgets 
closer to home.  
Thirdly, while it is tempting to see Post 9/11 security encroachments on schooling – 
both at home and abroad - as a ‘new’ development, there is a broad and critical 
literature on education that sees mass-schooling historically as a mode of pacification, 
a vehicle for the reproduction of social inequality, a tool of colonial power, and as a 
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vehicle for militarization and violence (Harber, 2004). Reflecting on the foundations 
of mass schooling in the West, Green notes that:  
The task of public schooling was not so much to develop new skills for the 
industrial sector as to inculcate habits of conformity, discipline and morality 
that would counter the widespread problems of social disorder’ (Green, 1990: 
59). 
Similarly, moving beyond pacification and conformity, there is a strong literature on 
schooling as indoctrination, that notes its role in inciting violence from Nazi 
Germany, to Rwanda and to state’s like Eritrea today (Harber,2004; Riggan, 2016). 
Furthermore, schooling has and remains a site for recruitment for military projects – 
whether voluntary or forced – from US military funded scholarships in lieu of 
enlistment, US military visits to schools, and non-state armed actors recruiting child 
soldiers. This instrumentalist understanding of schooling serving war can be backed 
up in the UK, by noting that the introduction of physical education into the UK 
schooling system in the early 20th Century was a direct result of a recognition by 
military leaders and politicians that the poor health of the British working class, had 
hampered their recruitment to fight on the frontline of the Boer War (Thorpe, 2003). 
Durodie (2016:21), reflecting on the ‘Prevent’ programme in the UK today, goes as 
far as to suggest that rather than seeing the security/education relationship as a one-
way street, he argues that ‘the language and practice of security appear to be being 
transformed by certain actions and assumptions already common to the world of 
education.’ 
The fourth point, relates to the theory and definitional discussion around 
‘securitization’ and what this means. Securitization theory emerged from the 
Copenhagen School of International Relations who had used the term to explore the 
way discourse was deployed to create the conditions under which the norms 
governing a social domain could be revised or suspended for security reasons (Buzan 
et al, 1998). This constructivist theory was used to explore how population groups 
could be persuaded to accept infringements on their rights in lieu of security. For the 
purpose of this work, securitization theory appears useful to exploring the way 
schooling has become caught up in Post 9/11 security strategy, both abroad and at 
home, and the discursive strategies used to justify this. Finally, moving beyond 
securitization as ‘discourse’ we also need to explore the complex ways that education 
and schooling have been drawn into the post 9/11 counter-insurgency and counter-
terror strategies and their material and discursive effects, particularly on youth, who 
are often the central target of interventions. Helpful in exploring the North/South 
relations in the security/development/education nexus, is the work of Duffield, who 
suggests that while governance logics might be similar, governance strategies diverge 
significantly between North and South. Duffield (2007) talks metaphorically of two 
‘species beings’ divided geographically, calling them the ‘insured’ and the ‘non-
insured’ peoples, with the former provided with access to basic rights and necessities 
(social protection) and the latter required to be self-reliant and self-reproducing. As a 
result, mechanisms of regulation and control diverge between the two ‘species 
beings’, and what is acceptable to discipline those populations widely divergent. 
Furthermore, Duffield argues that interventions into the lives of the ‘uninsured’ are 
aimed biopolitically to induce social action – ‘a new willingness to countenance a 
level of intrusion and degree of social engineering hitherto frowned upon by the 
international community’ (Duffield,2002:1050), aimed at getting ‘savages to fight 
barbarians’ (Duffield, 2005). 
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Returning to Foucault’s boomerang, the rest of the paper then will explore the 
complex inter-relationships between foreign policy abroad and education and national 
policy at home; trace the way education has become increasingly securitized and 
analyse both the intended and unintended outcomes of this process of securitizing 
education to support the war on terror and counter violent extremism (CVE).  
The Imperial roots of Securitization, CVE and Education 
In earlier work I have traced some of the roots of the education/security relationships 
linked to post 9/11 military activities (see Novelli, 2010, 2013). Implemented during 
the Cold War, when communism and the Soviet Union was seen as the West’s biggest 
security threat, Western governments’ under the leadership of the United States armed 
and funded Afghani, Pakistani and foreign ‘mujahideen’ to fight against the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. In education, this began with USAID’s funding of a hate 
curriculum implemented in refugee camps for Afghani refugees in Pakistan and 
Pakistani Madrasa’s. During this period, USAID paid the University of Nebraska 
U.S.$51 million from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design textbooks, which were 
mostly printed in Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at Afghan refugee camps 
and Pakistani madrasas (International Crisis Group 2002: 13). 
An example of the type of content developed is illustrated in a maths textbook for 4th 
grade children, which raises the following question (ibid: 92-93):  
The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at 
a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the 
Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike 
the Russian in the forehead. 
This hate curriculum contributed to the production of a generation of radicalised 
youth, on both sides of the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, which as we now know, has 
had terrible unintended consequences for the West – a point which I will return to 
later when we explore contemporary CVE programmes. For our earlier discussions, 
what this intervention highlights is the Cold War roots of Islamic ‘radicalisation’, the 
pivotal role of the United States in that process, the place that education had in that 
‘radicalisation’ strategy, and the unintended outcomes of the initiative when the 
global jihad switched from the USSR to the USA and used Afghanistan as the 
launching pad and training ground.   
Moving forward to the aftermath of 9/11, education – particularly for girls – was 
evoked as part of the justification for the invasion of Afghanistan – and remains a 
justification of last resort as things collapse in 2017. The ex UK Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown, back in 2009, noted that ‘development’ and within that ‘education’ 
were central planks in the UK strategy of both ‘winning hearts and minds’ in 
Afghanistan and protecting the UK from attack: 
….when the Taleban ran the country, only a million children were in school, 
all boys. Today there are 6.6 million - with more than 2 million girls. With the 
help of British development funding, 10,000 new teachers were recruited from 
2007 to 2008, with more expected in 2009. This is an investment in the future 
of Afghanistan, in its stability and its resilience against extremism - and 
therefore in our security (Brown, 2009:3). 
Similarly, ‘madrasa’ education in Pakistan was singled out as a source for the 
production of radical jihadists in the wake of 9/11, and exaggerated and inflated 
claims of the number of children attending radical madrasas was accepted 
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unquestionably by Western governments looking for easy answers to the rise of 
jihadism in Pakistan and Afghanistan - though without any reflexivity on their own 
role in generating this. The binary production of Islamic Education vs Western 
Secular education has now expanded across many of the contemporary theatres of 
conflict (Somalia/Yemen/Iraq/Pakistan/Afghanistan/Kenya) with attacks on both 
students, teachers and institutions by both militants and national and international 
forces (e.g. Peshawar massacre, 2014; Chenagai Madrasa airstrike 2006) against their 
respective educational nemesis.  
In Afghanistan, according to Human Rights Watch, education systems and personnel 
were attacked for three overlapping categories:  
First, opposition to the government and its international supporters by Taliban 
or other armed groups; second, ideological opposition to education other than 
that offered in madrassas (Islamic schools), and in particular opposition to 
girls’ education; and third, opposition to the authority of the central 
government and the rule of law by criminal groups (Human Rights Watch, 
2006: 33). 
Clearly in the case of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, education became a central 
battleground in the war and emphasizes the increasing dangers that all education 
personnel and students face there. The attack on Malala Yousafzai in October, 2012, 
became the most internationally visible example.  This polarization also occurred in 
Somalia (UN, 2008) and Iraq (Bonham Carter, 2007; O'Malley, 2007). Most 
problematically, both sides in these contexts increasingly interpreted education 
provision as a battle between Western secular education and Islamic madrassa 
education, an unhelpful and incorrect binary (McClure, 2009), that obscures more 
than it reveals. However, what is clear is that education is not simply a casualty of the 
current war on terror, but plays a central and contested role for all key actors.  
Education has also featured centrally in the West’s counterinsurgency strategy. In 
Iraq, after the initial removal of Sadaam Hussein in 2003, and the de-Bathification 
process, the US began rapidly to lose control. US Secretary of State, Rumsfeld’s 
strategy was failing and General Petraeus in 2006 was brought in as a widespread 
insurgency was expanding. Petraeus was a counterinsurgency scholar and from that 
point on a new counterinsurgency strategy was deployed, drawing on insights 
particularly from France’s war against insurgents in colonial Algeria in the 1960s. 
This is where international development – and education - therein, and particularly 
related to Afghanistan and Iraq, became part of the strategy for ‘winning hearts and 
minds’ in a changing US-led counterinsurgency war (Duffield, 2008; English, 2010; 
Gregory, 2008; Hayden, 2009; Hoffman, 2009; Lopez, 2010; Mezran, 2009; Miller & 
Mills, 2010; Zambernardi, 2010).  
In this strategy, education became a tool in the counterinsurgency process – both in 
terms of school reconstruction programmes, de-radicalization strategies, technical and 
vocational skills training for ‘at-risk’ youth – all geared at complimenting particular 
and contingent military missions aimed at pacifying local populations, ‘draining the 
swamp’ in counterinsurgency language – whereby efforts are made to break the link 
between insurgents and the communities that protect them. Centrally, education 
became related to the ‘security’ of western military forces, rather than the ‘security’ 
of local communities, and generally tied to very short term objectives that were likely 
to be detrimental to long term and sustainable development. This strategy was 
consolidated with the establishment by the Western occupying countries in both Iraq 
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and Afghanistan of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that under the control 
of the military also carried out development activities such as the construction of 
schools.  
In 2009 an alliance of NGOs operating in Afghanistan produced a strong report 
condemning the behavior of the Western occupying forces. They alleged that the 
military (particularly the US and France) were continuing to use ‘unmarked, white 
vehicles….conventionally used by the UN and aid agencies’ and were carrying out 
infrastructure work, including the construction of schools,  traditionally done by 
development organizations as part of their counterinsurgency ‘hearts and minds’ 
strategies (Waldman 2009, p.5).  All this, they argued, was producing a ‘blurring of 
the civil-military distinction… (and) contributed to a diminution in the perceived 
independence of NGOs, increased the risk for aid workers, and reduced the areas in 
which NGOs can safely operate” (Waldman 2009, p.9.)  
The activities of PRT’s were particularly critiqued for their focus on short-term 
security objectives using soft strategies such as school building and healthcare 
support, which would often later be withdrawn when the immediate security threat 
was resolved:  
Although touted as a marriage of equals between civilian and military actors, 
PRTs in Afghanistan are overwhelmingly military in scope and operation. The 
typical PRT consists of 80-100 soldiers, under the direct command of a 
military officer, focused heavily on force protection and security assistance. 
These figures dwarf the handful of individual representatives from State, 
USAID and the Department of Agriculture. More problematic than this 
imbalance in numbers is the generally poor development practice of PRTs and 
the relative lack of attention to promoting good governance and the rule of 
law. Where reconstruction activities have occurred, QIPs have often failed to 
take the longer-term development…, according to the U.S. interagency 
assessment of PRTs, “schools were built without teachers and clinics without 
doctors.” (Patrick & Brown, 2007: 6) 
Examples of the way education programming became utilized in counterinsurgency 
strategies are broad and varied.  Captain Chad Pillai (2009) of the US Army argued 
for the expansion of literacy and vocational training programmes implemented in Iraq 
to Afghanistan. These adult literacy centers and vocational education programmes 
were funded through the US Army’s Commanders Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF), and implemented directly by the US military rather than development 
agencies.  Pallai describes how in response to the low level of literacy of Iraqi police 
applicants and construction contractors in the cities of Tar Araf and Ar Ramadi, the 
military decided to develop an adult literacy program that would not only develop 
skills, but give youth alternative opportunities rather than joining insurgencies.  Pallai 
(2009) notes that ‘In addition to expanding Iraqi Security Forces, the adult education 
programs helped to ‘drain the swamp’ of potential insurgent recruits by providing 
alternative economic opportunities for the population’ (23).  
The diagram below (figure 1) (Pillai, 2009, 23) reflects visually the way education 
planning became militarized – note the ‘target’ of ‘young men between the ages of 
16-28’ and the overall objective of the programme to ‘reduce the number of potential 
recruits for Anti-Iraq Forces’. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
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While the article offers little concrete evidence of the impact of the programme, he 
asserts that:  
…Ar Ramadi has become one of the most peaceful cities in Iraq.  Although 
we cannot scientifically substantiate the importance of educational programs 
for adults, we also cannot ignore that it is the largest positive factor for our 
mission’s success. (24) 
In Afghanistan, education became one of the central battlefields of the conflict 
between the ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) and the Taliban. This 
revolved around both the West’s promotion of girls’ education, their attacks on 
Madrasa and religious education and the way school construction, particularly in the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, had become a key mechanism for winning hearts 
and minds.  
The dilemma for education aid workers was that the counterinsurgency and counter-
terrorism strategies of the Western powers become the perceived major rationale for 
educational interventions and while activities may remain largely the same, their 
discursive representation means that they can be interpreted as part of the ‘war effort’: 
civilian modes of counterinsurgency, aimed at winning hearts and minds and 
producing certain types of subjectivities. In doing so they increased the danger for all 
involved.  
In situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan it appears that humanitarian and 
development organizations became overwhelmed by the counterinsurgency agenda, 
making it almost impossible to distance themselves from the occupying forces and 
present a picture of neutrality. One researcher from Médecins Sans Frontières raised 
the question of the problem of carrying out humanitarian and development activities 
under the overarching rule of an occupying power, arguing that whether they directly 
engage with the occupying forces or not: 
Over time, the resentment that often builds up within a population against 
foreign rule can lead to an equally violent rejection of all changes brought 
about by outside actors, their claimed neutrality notwithstanding. (Crombe, 
2006:5) 
Furthermore, the use of education as a weapon of counterinsurgency undermined the 
efficacy and long-term viability of educational assistance, politicized the education 
system, distorted and diverted resources away from more sustainable education 
assistance and reduced the credibility of aid to education.  
Extrapolating from the empirical evidence above, what we can garner from the 
education/development/security nexus is firstly its security logic, which aimed at 
winning ‘war’, maintaining the status quo, and not addressing the root causes of the 
conflict. The use of education as a weapon of counterinsurgency turns it into a means 
to an end, rather than an end in itself. That is, as a means of recruiting informers, a 
domain of surveillance, a recruitment ground for collaborators, a mechanism for 
pacifying youth – keeping them busy, etc. – means which are not traditionally 
associated with the goal of education and development, and which served to 
undermine the potential transformatory role of the sector. Secondly, what we can also 
see is its short termism – aimed at fire-fighting, winning terrain at conjunctural 
moments, controlling, pacifying, recruiting, with little long term development 
thinking and planning. More generally it undermined the efficacy and long term 
viability of educational assistance, politicized the education systems, distorted and 
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diverted resources away from more sustainable education assistance and reduced the 
credibility of aid to education. Thirdly, the ‘soft’ strategy allowed for the ‘co-option of 
a range of actors’, such as NGOs/Humanitarian educators in the broader counter 
terrorism/insurgency strategy (whether willingly or not). All became part of the 
‘combat team’ - to paraphrase a rather unfortunate speech form Colin Powell, in 
2001:  
Just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there 
serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom… NGOs are such a force 
multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team. (Powell, 2001:3) 
Fourthly, the strategy served to politicise education, leading to the sector, its 
institutions and practitioners, becoming caught in the middle of the conflict, and 
subject to military attention from both sides, breaking down relationships between the 
education institutions, educators and the community and compounding threat levels. 
Finally, the strategy served to deligitimise foreign actors working in the education 
sector, undermine their humanitarian imperatives and weaken any bonds of trust that 
they previously had with local communities.  
CVE in the UK: ‘Preventing or Provoking Violent Extremism?  
Having laid out some of the ways education became securitized through Western ‘war 
on terror’ related interventions abroad, we now turn to the way schooling in the UK 
has become caught up in post-9/11 homeland concerns. This will be done through an 
exploration of the ‘Prevent’ programme, which began in 2003 and in 2017 permeates 
the entire UK education system from pre-school to University, with institutions and 
educators now under a statutory duty to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism5.’   
‘Prevent’ was created in 2003 as part of a broader national counter-terrorism strategy 
known as CONTEST, which included the 'four P's' of Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and 
Prepare. As its name suggests, ‘Prevent’ was seen as a strategy to identify potential 
terrorist suspects prior to any attack, with the 2009 counterterrorism strategy 
describing the Prevent strategy as aimed at ‘stopping people becoming terrorists or 
supporting violent extremism’ (Home Office,2009). This evolution has to be 
contextualized within the broader development of the post 9/11 war on terror 
responses to security threats. This includes the fallout from the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the concern with ‘homegrown’ terrorists after the 2004 Madrid 
bombings and the 2005, 7/7 London bombings, the rise of ISIS, the outbreak of war in 
Syria and increased concern that a significant number of UK Muslims have and 
continue to join the war in Syria. This period has also seen a shift from a Labour 
government (1997-2010) to a Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition (2010-2015) 
to a Conservative Party government (2015-date), which has also led to changes in the 
way the ‘Prevent’ programme has evolved, both in terms of conceptualization and 
resources. 
According to the current website ‘Prevent’ seeks to: 
                                                
5 Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain bodies (“specified 
authorities” listed in Schedule 6 to the Act), in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the need to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism”.This guidance is issued under section 29 of the Act. The Act states that the 
authorities subject to the provisions must have regard to this guidance when carrying out the duty. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance  
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• respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it  
• prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure they are given 
appropriate advice and support, and  
• work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization which 
we need to address.  
David Omond, one of the founders of ‘Prevent’, noted in an interview that the 
founding objectives were linked to building and supporting better community 
integration:  
Prevent was all about preventing violent extremism. So a useful parallel for 
Prevent work in the UK could be seen in earlier programmes to discourage 
young people from becoming a gang member – you are trying to stop the route 
into violence. Prevent is about persuading people that violence, including 
against innocents, is not a legitimate way in a democracy to promote your 
aims.... (OSF, 2015:22). 
This early approach resulted in a large amount of resources directed towards Muslim 
organizations to try to promote better integration and community cohesion, alongside 
detection and referral strategies for vulnerable or at risk youth. In the Preface to the 
2011updated Prevent strategy, the new Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government challenged this earlier integrationist focus:  
 the Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It 
confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with 
Government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist 
ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk 
of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent should have been confronting’ (Home Office, 2011, 
Preface). 
The revised approach was focused on two key pillars: promoting British Values and 
increasing the surveillance capacities of institutions to detect potential threats. David 
Omong, reflects on this shift:  
Notions which later crept in about the need to promote specifically ‘British 
values’, including equality for women, however justified, were not an explicit 
part of the CONTEST strategy to prevent violent extremism.... Policing is 
about upholding the criminal law, not about policing some concept of 
‘Britishness’ in the community (OSF, 2015:22). 
This emphasis on British Values, post 2011, has increased the feeling that ‘Prevent’ is 
aimed at non-traditional ‘British’ subjects, and particularly Muslims, with the implicit 
assumption that they need to modify their identity and attitudes. The notion of 
promoting ‘British values’ has itself been subjected to a variety of challenges, with 
questions relating to what is particular about British values, and who gets to define 
them. It has also been seen as a mechanism through which to attack multiculturalism 
and push a far more assimilationist agenda, which by its very nature stigmatizes 
immigrant communities: 
Recent policy has created an environment in which teachers are now 
accountable for the agendas of national security and anti-terrorism and where 
Ofsted believes it is at liberty to police schools’ interpretation of what 
constitutes fundamental British values…. Education has become a conduit 
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through which the intersection of counterterrorism and the standards have 
resulted in the expectation that teachers will pursue and enforce a racialized 
security agenda (Elton-Cheltcraft et al , 2016:33).  
The support for ‘British Values’ has been accompanied with a switch from the 
language of ‘violent extremism’ to the language of ‘radicalization’. This appears to be 
underpinned by an ‘elevator’ or ‘conveyor belt’ theory of radicalization that the 
journey from alienated citizen to violent terrorist follows a number of stages from 
exposure to ideas through to action. Part of this literature, has focussed upon 
redefining terms such as ‘radicalism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, including 
challenging perceived boundaries between violent and non-violent extremism 
(Schmid, 2013, 2014, Bale, 2013). Despite being widely critiqued, both in terms of 
what constitutes ‘radicalisation’ and the ‘radical’ and the difficulties in defining the 
term, and also in terms of the linear and epidemiological model, which appears to 
treat radicalization as an illness or a virus that can be treated (O’Donnell, 2016), it has 
nevertheless become the dominant approach.  
For Kundnani the concept of radicalisation has become the master signifier of the late 
‘war on terror’’ (2012:3), arguing that it provides a means through which the causes 
of terrorism could be discussed in very restricted ways that focus down on the 
‘individual’. As Coppock & McGovern (2009:629) note:  
A focus on ‘radicalisation’ establishes the a-priori assumption that the search 
for the ‘causes of terrorism’ is essentially to be found at the level of the 
attitudes and actions of the individual, the task at hand therefore established as 
the ‘rooting out’ of future terrorists rather than what might be thought of as 
root causes.  
In a powerful article, Sukarieh & Tannock (2015) argue that what lies at the heart of 
the ‘Prevent’ strategy reframing of ‘radical’ is a desire not only to suppress radical 
Islam, but also to reclaim and subvert the broader transformatory potential of ‘radical’ 
education, just at a time when radical education is needed the most. By defining 
radicalization as negative and linking it to terrorism, they argue that the state is 
essentially trying to undermine youth aspirations for large scale, social 
transformations. 
The Prevent shift, post 2011, has led to a much more systematic focus on schools and 
education institutions, aimed at making institutions and their staff responsible for 
identifying potential radicalization suspects, and promoting core British values 
throughout the institution. In 2015, this became a statutory duty with individuals and 
institutions subject to disciplinary/legal procedures if they fail to comply, and a duty 
to refer any possible subjects they deem vulnerable to radicalisation. This obligation 
has now been incorporatied into OFSTED school inspection processes, with huge 
numbers of teachers and administrators undergoing training in their ‘Prevent’ 
obligations. This has led to a range of concerns about the student/teacher relationship 
of trust, coupled with a concern that the security apparatus were increasingly policing 
education institutions, their actors, and the contents of their classes. There has also 
been growing concern about the quality of the training and the capacity of the trained 
teachers to identify and deal with ‘radicalization’.  
The shift in focus has led to a spike in both the number of referrals to Channel (the 
counter-terrorism program that evaluates at risk youth), and an increase in referrals 
from education institutions. Between April 2007 and the March 31, 2014, there were a 
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total of 3934 referrals. However, in 2015, alone there was 3994 people referred, a 
number that had increased by 300% from the year before. According to The Guardian 
(2016) ‘of the 3,994 people referred under the Prevent strategy to the Channel 
programme in 2015, 1,319 reports came from the education sector’.   
The article goes on to note that:  
Although the NPCC does not routinely collect information on the religion of 
the individuals referred to Prevent, in 2015 1,394 identified as Muslim, 139 as 
Christian, 12 as Sikh, five as Buddhist, four as Hindu and three as Jewish. Ten 
people said their religion was other, while 19 said they had no religion. 
That Muslims are the main target and perceived threat is indisputable despite more 
recent references to the dangers of far-right terrorism in Norway and elsewhere, and 
the subsequent inclusion of materials relating to the far-right in the training syllabus. 
The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) on its website notes that: 
The greatest threat the UK currently faces is from terrorists who claim to act 
in the name of Islam, and who specifically target Muslims. Therefore Prevent 
activity such as the support offered through Channel predominately takes 
place in and with Muslim communities. However, the principles of Channel 
apply equally to other communities who may be the focus of attention from 
violent extremist groups6.  
This increased focus of the Prevent programme on detection and surveillance, has also 
had some very high profile failures that have lost the programme a great deal of 
credibility. These include a 10-year old Lancashire boy being referred to Channel 
after mistakenly misspelling ‘terraced house’ for ‘terrorist house’7, and a four-year-
old boy at nursery school who was referred after mispronouncing ‘cucumber’ and 
instead saying ‘cooker bomb’. While laughable, the stigmatization of Muslim 
communities is evident and worrying. What is of further concern is that of all the 
referrals to Channel, 80% of cases required no further action. How do those 80% of 
people feel after having been wrongly referred, and what does that mean for their 
attitude towards UK society and its state institutions? 
As Guru (2012:1155) notes, more generally about Prevent and the way it stigmatizes 
Muslims: 
Demeaning experiences are likely to produce defensive, ‘closed’ communities, 
as they attempt to secure cultural values and practices and foster a sense of 
‘us’ and ‘them’, as self-serving agendas are promoted on both sides of the 
divide. Feelings of injustice are likely to fester as people develop a sense of 
low morale and low self-esteem, resulting in a lack of confidence to exercise 
their rights and obligations as citizens and to form formal and informal 
relationships within and across communities 
Reflecting on Foucault’s earlier quote, there is a sense in some parts of the UK, where 
there is a substantial Muslim population, that they are under ‘siege’, placed under 
surveillance, securitized and viewed with suspicion. Nowhere was this felt more 
strongly than in Birmingham, during what became known as the ‘Trojan horse affair’, 
whereby school governors in several inner city schools were accused of being part of 
a plot to take over schools and radicalise the pupils. Multiple investigations found 
                                                6	See	http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx		7	See	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-35354061		
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little evidence of these claims, but coverage in the press and media, and the comments 
of high profile politicians, severely stigmatized the city and its Muslim communities 
in modes reminiscent of colonial ‘divide and rule’ practices (Arthur, 2015; Clarke, 
2014; Awan, 2014).  
In the conclusions to an interesting study by the Open Society Foundation into 
‘Prevent’, they note that:  
there are serious indications that Prevent is counterproductive. The case 
studies show that being wrongly targeted under Prevent has led some Muslims 
to question their place in British society. Other adults wrongfully targeted 
under Prevent have said that, had they been different, their experience of 
Prevent could have drawn them towards terrorism, and not away from it (OSF, 
2016: 6).  
Conclusions  
Drawing together insights from the education/security nexus at home and abroad, I 
now want to reflect on some of the points of convergence/divergence emerging from 
this exploration. Firstly, it is clear that the education/security relationship has emerged 
as an important site of intervention in both the UK and those key sites of attention 
abroad. Yet the nature of that relationship appears quite distinct. In Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and Pakistan education has become a central battleground for attacks by oppositional 
forces, with curriculum reform, girls’ education, madrassa education as central 
dividing lines between the warring factions. Schools have also been drawn into 
US/UK counterinsurgency strategy, with funding and school construction used as a 
mechanism for winning hearts and minds. In the UK, education seems to be seen 
much more as a site of surveillance and psycho-social intervention, particularly since 
2010. Teachers and institutions are drawn into acting as state agents, legally bound to 
monitor the bodies of potential ‘radicals’ and to be agents for the promotion and 
defence of British Values. In Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq it is often humanitarian 
workers that have become to be seen as ‘agents’ of the state, working in tandem with 
foreign military forces. This has led to a sharp increase in violent attacks on aid 
workers in these regions as those lines between military and civilian become 
increasingly blurred (Novelli, 2010). While UK teachers have not been subject to 
such violent attacks, their surveillance role appears likely to change their relationship 
with pupils and their families, and raise the likelihood that Muslim children are less 
willing to express their opinions openly to them for fear of reprisals. Rather than 
preventing radicalization, this runs the risk of pushing discussion underground, and 
moving it to spaces where teachers and others are far less likely to be able to 
intervene.    
In both cases, we can see the encroachment of security actors and logics into the 
internal affairs of education institutions and the breakdown of trust between 
humanitarian workers and target communities and teachers, students and their parents 
respectively. Both humanitarian workers and teachers appear to be feeling 
uncomfortable in this role, and spaces of resistance to the securitization of their role 
growing. Similarly, in their framing of the conflict and the resultant strategy and 
tactics – both at home and abroad – there is little evidence of genuine engagement 
with the long-term underpinnings of conflict and its structural dimensions. There 
appears little space for discussion over Western strategy in the Middle East, the 
military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere or the highly unequal and 
exclusionary global political economy and polity that underpins uneven global 
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development and seems to drive conflict. Similarly, in the UK, the Prevent strategy 
currently avoids discussion over the conditions under which young Muslim’s are 
integrated into UK society, Islamophobia and racism. However, while one is framed 
in the individualizing and psychologizing of the radical, the other is far more 
militarized. In this sense we can see divergence between what Duffield calls the 
‘insured’ and ‘non-insured’ in the governance techniques deployed. This is not 
dissimilar to the conclusions drawn by Graham (2010) when talking of the use of 
unmanned drones at home and abroad. In Pakistan and Afghanistan drones were 
armed and utilized for military attacks on targets, while in the USA the drones were 
deployed for surveillance purposes, which while threatening and intrusive, are not 
lethal. In essence, what we are seeing in these divergent strategies is a reflection of 
the value placed on ‘insured’ and ‘non-insured’ life. At a more abstract level, in both 
spaces we are increasingly being trained to see ‘the world as a battlefield’ (Scahill, 
2013) in a complex asymmetrical war that is fought out on multiple terrains and in 
many different ways, with the education sector increasingly becoming an important 
zone of engagement and contention. Crucially, in both contexts, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the securitization of education is contributing to the 
production of more peaceful conditions, within and outside the classroom, and often 
appears to aggravate tensions and conflict.  
Ultimately, the security logics of interventions in education – both abroad and at 
home, reflect a broader reluctance on the part of its architects to openly engage in 
discussion and debate as to the root causes of conflict, and go beyond a pathological 
diagnosis that anyone that resists Western hegemony is either an enemy combatant, 
criminal or ill. A dialogical pedagogy that could open up this debate, sensitively and 
responsibly handled, would surely have more of a chance to bring fragmented 
communities together, rebuild relationships and work towards collective responses to 
redressing the structural inequalities and obstacles that currently underpin conflicts. 
Ultimately, as researchers, educators, practitioners and humanitarian workers we can 
choose to be shaped by these securitized agendas or resist them, but we can no longer 
stand at the sidelines, as the neutral ground has been taken away from under our feet.  
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